Fordham Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 2

Article 2

1964

Homicide Under the Proposed New York Penal Law
Robert M. Byrn

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert M. Byrn, Homicide Under the Proposed New York Penal Law, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 173 (1964).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol33/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Homicide Under the Proposed New York Penal Law
Cover Page Footnote
Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; member of the New York Bar.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol33/iss2/2

HOMICJDE UNDER THE PROPOSED NEW YORK
PENAL LAW
ROBERT 31. BYRN*
In a sense, the scales are heavily weighted against the draftsman: if he has nade

himself plain, there is likely to be no litigation and so none to praise hinz, whereas
if he has fallen into confusion of obscurity, the reports will probably record the

results of the fierce and critical intellects of both Bar and Bench being brought to
bear on his work. Yet the debt owed to him, by the legal profession is incalculable.'

AT the outset, it is only fitting that we acknowledge the incalculable
debt owed to the State of New York Temporary Commission on

Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code for its awesome accomplishment in formulating a new and comprehensive penal law.- Sir Edward
Coke is quoted as having said of certain statutes that "they were so like
labyrinths with such intricate windings and turnings, as little or no
fruit proceeded of them."' Perhaps our existing criminal laws cannot be

so harshly indicted, but it is certainly true that at times they have borne
bitter fruit and at other times the fruit has been lost amid a tangle of

impenetrable and thorny branches. Yet by scholarly excision, relocation,
restatement, and innovation, the Temporary Commission has, in three

years, produced a modern and scientifically integrated code out of the
maze of over twelve hundred sections in the existing penal law.

Justice Stephen once stated of Acts of Parliament that
although they may be easy to understand, people continually try to misunderstand,
and.., therefore it is not enough to attain to a degree of precision which a person
reading in good faith can understand; but it is necessary to attain if possible to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; member of the Nev.,
York Bar.
1. Mlegarry, Miscellany at Law 349 (rev. ed. 1956).
2. "This Commission was legislatively created in 1961 for the purpose of studying 'existing proxsions of the penal law, the code of criminal procedure, the correction law and
other related statutes,' and of preparing, 'for submission to the legislature, a revised, Zimplifled body of substantive laws relating to crimes and offenses in this state, as well as a revised, simplified code of rules and procedures relating to criminal and quai-criminal actions
and proceedings ... ' (Laws 1961, chapter 346, as amended by Laws 1962, chapter 545)."
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 14, p. 9 (1964) (Third Interim Report of the State of New York
Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code). In addition to
submitting a proposed penal law (Sen. Intro. No. 3918, Pr. No. 4690, Ass. Intro. No.
5376, Pr. No. 61S7, N.Y. State Leg. 187th Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as Propozed Pen.
Law] with explanatory notes annexed, the Temporary Commission has issued three interim
reports, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 41 (1962) [hereinafter cited as First Report], N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. S (1963) [hereinafter cited as Second Report], and N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 14 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Third Report].
3. Russell, Essays and Excursions in Law 90 (1929).
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a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand.
4
It is all the better if he cannot pretend to misunderstand it.

Just as Stephen called for precision in legislation, his American contemporary, Holmes, called for rationality in the law:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. 5

Keeping in mind Stephen's and Holmes' lofty standards of precision and
rationality, and cast, perhaps, in the role of an ungrateful debtor of the
Temporary Commission, I should now like to turn to an appraisal of some
of the Commission's proposals making generous use of such of the lawyer's
"quiddities" and "quillets" as I am able to muster.0
I. GENERAL COMMENTS

The Proposed New York Penal Law is divided into three "Parts", comprising "General Provisions," "Specific Offenses," and "Administrative
and Civil Provisions." Part Two, "Specific Offenses," is arranged by
categories of related offenses, in place of the haphazard alphabetical
system presently in use. Each category bears a "Title," and the separate
but related offenses within each title are given individual "Article" numbers, the articles being further subdivided into "Sections" by a decimal
system. For instance, the offense of murder is defined at Section 130.25
of Article 130 (Homicide) in Title H (Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation).
The proposed homicide article may be outlined as follows: section
130.00 defines homicide; section 130.05 gives the meaning of certain
terms which are principally related to abortional offenses; section 130.10
defines criminally negligent homicide; section 130.15 divides manslaughter in the second degree into homicides arising out of (1) recklessness, (2) an unlawful abortion upon a woman believed to be pregnant,
or (3) the intentional causing or aiding of a suicide; section 130.20
separates manslaughter in the first degree into homicides caused by acts
(1) intended to do serious bodily injury, (2) intended to kill, but committed under the influence of extreme emotional distress, or (3) intended
to procure a miscarriage of a female pregnant with an unborn child;
section 130.25 classifies murder as killings which: (1) are intentional
4.

In re Castioni, [1890) 1 Q.B. 149, 167-68.

5. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
6. "There's another I Why may not that be the skull of a lawyer? Where be his quidditics
now, his quillets, his cases, his tenures, and his tricks?" Hamlet, Act V, scene 1.
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(2) are the result of a depraved indifference to human life; or (3) occur
under specified circumstances during the commission of certain felonies;
sections 130.30 and 130.35 are concerned with the punishment for
murder, while sections 130.40 through 130.60 define the offenses of
abortion, killing an unborn child, self-abortion, filicide of an unborn
child, and issuing abortional articles.
The abortional and suicidal offenses, as well as the nature of and the
procedures for the punishment of murder, are without the scope of this
paper. Mly intention, rather, is to outline briefly the traditional commonlaw categories of culpable homicides, and then to pursue each of these
crimes through existing New York statutes and into the proposed penal
law, with accompanying comments and suggestions.7
II. HomicIDE AT ComIoN LAW
At common law, there were only two grades of unlawful killing, murder
and manslaughter,' which were distinguished from each other by the presense or absence of malice aforethought.0 Within the crime of murder,
malice aforethought was "express" when the unlawful killing was accompanied by an intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm and was
"implied" in cases of a homicide which occurred (1) under circumstances
indicating a depraved indifference to human life, (2) during the commission of, or attempt to commit a felony, or (3) while forcibly opposing an
officer who was making a lawful arrest, or performing certain other
official duties."0
While the crime of murder had definite boundaries, manslaughter was
an omnibus catchall for such unjustifiable and inexcusable homicides as
did not fall within the definition of murder." However, certain rather
general categories were discernable. Voluntary manslaughter involved a
provoked killing in the heat of passion with an accompanying intent to
kill or do grievous bodily harm, while involuntary manslaughter signified
7. "The drama latent in almost every sentence of the penal statutes dealing with
homicide, appeals to the interest of the layman as well as of the lawyer, and some of the
most fascinating and discursive questions in the entire field of criminal law have their
source in these statutes." Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York, 6 Fordham L. Rev. 43

(1937).
S. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Communication and Study Relating to Homicide, N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 65(P), p. 19 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Homicide Report]; Moreland, The
Law of Homicide 60 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Moreland].
9. Homicide Report 19; Moreland 60; Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law 132 (6th
ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as Stephen].
10. Homicide Report 19-21; Moreland 13-is; Perkins, Criminal Law 30-33 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Perkins]; Stephen 132-33.
11. Homicide Report ISS; Moreland 61; Perkins 41.
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an unintentional killing during the performance of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or during the performance of a lawful act in a
negligent manner.' 2
III. HOMICIDE IN NEW YoRK: AT PRESENT AND AS PROPOSED
Homicide is presently defined as "the killing of one human being by
the act, procurement or omission of another."" The definition, on its face,
is all-inclusive and, hence, homicide in se is not a crime.' 4 In the proposed
statute, however, homicide is defined as "the killing of a person or of an
unborn child by the act, procurement or omission of another person under
circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent
homicide, killing an unborn child or filicide of an unborn child as defined
in this article."'" As a result, homicide becomes a generic label for all unlawful killings.
A. Homicide Resulting From an Act Intended to Kill
An intentional killing, which is neither excusable nor justifiable, is murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree under existing New
York statutes, depending upon the presence, or absence, of deliberation
and premeditation. 6 The intentional but unpremeditated killing finds its
common law counterpart in voluntary manslaughter which was defined as
follows:
12. See generally Moreland 64-195; Perkins 41-61. There have been convictions of involuntary manslaughter based upon a negligent omission to act when a legal duty to act
existed, see Moreland 171-82, but these have been relatively rare. "In the common law,
there has been a persistent refusal to recognize liability in omission, either in tort or criminal
law." Binavince, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 11
(1964). Misdemeanors involving an omission to act have attained some significance In the
law of misdemeanor manslaughter in New York. See pp. 200-03 infra. There have also been
convictions of voluntary manslaughter arising out of circumstances other than provocation
and heat of passion. See Moreland 87-98. However these cases are unimportant to our discussion of the law of homicide.
13. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1042.
14. Homicide is subdivided into: "1. Murder; or, 2. Manslaughter; or, 3. Excusable
homicide; or, 4. Justifiable homicide." N.Y. Pen. Law § 1043. "[Sjection 1043 is intended to
include every species of homicide." People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 453, 159 N.E. 394, 395
(1927).
15. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.00.
16. "The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the
first degree, when committed: 1. From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the
death of the person killed, or of another ... ." N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044. "Such killing of a human
being is murder in the second degree, when committed with a design to effect the death of
the person killed, or of another, but without deliberation and premeditation." N.Y. Pen.
Law § 1046.
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homicide, which would otherwise be murder, is not murder, but manslaughter, if
the act by which death is caused is done in the heat of passion, caused by provocation ...unless the provocation was sought or17voluntarily provoked by the offender
as an excuse for ldlling or doing bodily harm.

At common law the varieties of conduct which might be said to constitute adequate provocation were rigidly catalogued, Moreover, the
heat of passion had to be sudden i.e., the killing must have occurred before a reasonable "cooling time" had elapsed. 10 Clearly then, the common
law employed strictly objective standards with respect to both the
adequacy of the provocation and the duration of the heat of passion.
In defining murder in the second degree, the New York Legislature
eschewed the affirmatively couched requirements of reasonable provocation and heat of passion in favor of the exclusionary test of the lack of
premeditation and deliberation. Seemingly implicit in this variation of the
elements of the crime was the substitution of the subjective cognative
operations of the defendant for the external norms of the common law.
However, no such clear dichotomy developed. It is true that in one line
of cases the courts took an entirely subjective approach. The nature of
the provocation and the length of the cooling time were both subordinated
to the totality of facts which demonstrated the actor's actual failure to
deliberate and premeditate. On the other hand, another series of decisions
emphasized the time elapsing between the provocation and the homicide
(perhaps only a few seconds) as, for all practical purposes, the determinative evidence of premeditation and deliberation-apparently a return to the objective standards of the common law.21 The evolution of
the two lines of authority did much to obscure the originally intended
distinction between first and second degree murder'' with the result that
17. Stephen 185.
18. "The following acts may ... amount to provocation:-(a.) An as-ault and battery
of such a nature as to inflict actual bodily harm, or great insult, is a provocation to the
person assaulted. (b.) If two persons quarrel, and fight upon equal terms, and upon the
spot, whether with deadly weapons or otherwise, each gives provocation to the other, whichever is right in the quarrel, and whichever strikes the first blow. (c.) An unlawful imprisonment is a provocation to the person imprisoned .... (d.) The sight of the act of adultery
committed with his wife is provocation to the husband of the adulterezs on the part both
of the adulterer and of the adulteress. (e.) The sight of the act of sodomy committed upon
a man's son is provocation to the father on the part of the person committing the offence.
(f.) Neither words, nor gestures, nor injuries to property, nor breaches of contract, amount
to provocation .... (g.) The employment of lawful force against the person of another is

not a
19.
20.
21.

provocation to the person against whom it is employed." Id. at ISG-S7.
Homicide Report 23-24; Perkins 53.
The cases on both sides are reviewed in Homicide Report 52-S3.
The New York Law Revision Commission found that the law of murder had been
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the defendant was often abandoned to the unbridled and unpredictable
sympathies and apathies of judge and jury.2
Confronted with these problems, the Temporary Commission has proposed the following statutes:
A person is guilty of murder when:
1. With intent to kill another person, he causes the death of such person or of
a third person, except when:
(a) He engages in such conduct under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance so as to render him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree as
defined in subdivision two of section 130.20 .. . .23
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: .. .
2. With intent to kill another person, he causes the death of such person or of a
third person under circumstances which would constitute murder as defined in subdivision one of section 130.25 except that the homicidal act is committed under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be .... 24

The proposed formulation, which is an adaptation of an equivalent provision25 in the Model Penal Code,2" is purportedly an attempt to balance
rendered "vague and indefinite" and that "bare intent to kill" had been "confounded with
deliberation." Id. at 83.

22. "In effect, therefore, the fate of each defendant in a first degree murder prosecution
hangs upon the caprice of the jury whom chance may have selected for him." Id. at 84.
"What we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the
suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seem to call irresistibly for the ex-,
ercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving them this dispensing power, but It should be
given to them directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words. The present distinction is so
obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to assimilate and
understand it." Cardozo, Law and Literature 100 (1931).
New York, it seems, is not the only state which has experienced problems. The obfuscation
of deliberation and premeditation exists "to an alarming extent." Brenner, The Impulsive
Murder and the Degree Device, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 274, 280 (1953). For a general review
of the law interpreting the doctrine of premeditation and deliberation, see Keedy, A Problem
of First Degree Murder: Fisher v. United States, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267-77 (1950).
23. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25 (Murder).
24. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.20 (Manslaughter in the first degree).
25.

Model Penal Code § 210.3(b) (Off. Draft 1962).

26. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.20, Commission Staff Notes. The Temporary Commission
has stated that "the recently published American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, of
which Commissioner Wechsler was the chief reporter, has been an invaluable source of
stimulation and guidance throughout the course of the Commission's work. The revisions, in
recent years, of the penal codes of Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin have also been Important aids." Proposed Pen. Law, Commission Foreword at v-vi.
Section 210.3 of the Model Penal Code reads: "(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: ... (b) A homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable ex-
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the relevant subjective
and objective factors deemed appropriate for
27
jury consideration.
The apparent intrusion of even minimal external norms of reasonableness will disappoint the proponents of trial by psychiatry.29- But a second
reading of section 130.20 reveals that the proffered test of reasonableness
is not really meaningful. We are told that reasonableness "shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation ....
'" What
is the actor's "situation"? Does it comprehend none or some or all of the
peculiarly subjective forces operating on the actor? Are we to consider,
for instance, that the actor has "the hot blood of Southern Europe coursing through his viens,"3 0 and then judge him by the standard of the
reasonably hot-blooded Southern European? Not only does the proposed
revision not answer these questions, but its ambiguity was deliberately
contrived to allow "room for interpretation."13' All that has happened is
that one "mystifying cloud of words"3 2 has been substituted for another.
Every harsh word that the Law Revision Commission had to say in 1937
about the extant law of premeditation and deliberation33 may well be
said again today about the proposed law of extreme emotional disturbance. Moreover, we may add a further charge to the indictment when we
consider the section in relation to the proposed defense of "mental disease
or defect." 34
planation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be." Since section 130.20(2) of the proposed penal law originated in section
210.3 of the Model Penal Code, comments upon the latter are relevant to our dcAzion of
the former.
27. Model Penal Code § 201.3, comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
28. See Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Rcasonablcnezs of
the Reasonable Man, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021 (1953). "After many years of hiding behind
the reasonable man, it is time that the law recognized the fact that the crucial issue in every
homicide case is the state of the mind of the slayer and that it is the psychiatrist and not
the reasonable man who will help the courts determine what that is." Id. at 1040.
29. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.20(2).
30. People v. Fiorentino, 197 N.Y. 560, 563, 91 N.E. 195, 196 (1910) (memorandum decision).
31. "'here will be room, of course, for interpretation of the breadth of meaning carried
by the word 'situation', precisely the room needed in our view. There will be room for argument as to the reasonableness of the explanations or excuses offered; we think again that
argument is needed in these terms. The question in the end w.ll be whether the actors loss
of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy enough to call for mitigation in the sentence. That seems to us the issue to be faced." Model Penal Code § 2013, comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
32. Cardozo, op. ciL supra note 22, at 100.
33. See notes 21 & 22 supra.

34. Proposed Pen. Law § 60.05.
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Irresistible impulse, alone, has never constituted a defense of insanity
in New York.s But irresistible impulse, in an expanded form, finds its
way into the proposed penal law, via the Model Penal Code,8" in the
following terms:
1. A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity:
(a) To know or to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; or
(b) To conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
2. As used in this section, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include
an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con37
duct.

What is first to be noted is the statement of irresistible impulse in terms
of the actor's lack of substantial capacity to conform. Unlike the traditional irresistible impulse test, the revision does not require a complete
inability to resist. 8 If, therefore, the inability to conform in section 60.05

can be identified with the influence of extreme emotional disturbance in
section 130.20," 9 the two will be distinguished only by the degree of impairment of volitional capacity, i.e., substantial versus insubstantial.
On its face the mental disease or defect section imports a lack of selfcontrol, a lack of substantial capacity to resist. The supporting comments
for, the manslaughter section4 in the Model Penal Code also refer to the
"actor's loss of self-control." Hence, each section contemplates the same
psychological phenomenon, the absence to a greater or lesser degree of
35. See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915); N.Y. Pen. Law
§ 34: "A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person
who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms
no defense to a prosecution therefor."
36. The proposed New York mental disease or defect section is adapted from Model
Penal Code § 4.01 (Off. Draft 1962). Second Report 20. Hence, comments upon both
formulations are relevant here.
37. Proposed Pen. Law § 60.05. (Emphasis added.)
38. See Model Penal Code § 4.01, comments 2, 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Second Report 21.
39. Lack of premeditation has, at times, been analogized to an impulse that Is Irresistible.
See, e.g., People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256, 267, 43 N.E. 635, 638 (1896); People v. Conroy,
97 N.Y. 62, 75 (1884). In People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930), Judge
Cardozo stated: "At the trial the vital question was the defendant's state of mind at the
moment of the homicide. Did he shoot with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill?
Was he so inflamed by drink or by anger or by both combined that, though he knew the
nature of his act, he was the prey to sudden impulse, the fury of the fleeting moment?" Id.
at 194-95, 172 N.E. at 467.
40. See note 31 supra. It should be noted that neither section requires that the loss of
self-control be the result of spontaneous impulse. See Model Penal Code § 4.01, comment 3
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), § 201.6, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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self-control. Indeed, the identity of the phenomenon is a necessary corollary to the theory of irresistible impulse.
We must begin with the presumption that "the mind is not functionally
compartmentalized but, in keeping with the now universally accepted
psychological theory of integration, the will, the intellect and the emotions are interdependent." 41 Next let us recall that the proponents of the
irresistible impulse test readily admit that the actor knows the nature and
wrongfulness of his act, but they urge that he may lack capacity to
refrain from doing what he knows to be wrong.4 - Since the intellect remains functioning, the trouble must stem from another of the integral
parts of the personality. The emotions being part of the personality, it
follows that severe emotional distress may disrupt the whole interdependent mental apparatus, including the ability to exercise selfcontrol.4 3 Therefore, the person who kills another under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance does so, at least in part, because his
capacity to conform to law has been diminished. In short, if one accepts
the irresistible impulse theory, one must also accept that the manslaughter
and mental disease or defect sections are on the common ground of
diminished capacity to conform, differing from each other only in the
degree of diminution.
The argument may be made, however, that the sections are intended to
be distinguished, not by the nature of the psychological phenomenon, but
by its causes; that is to say, the manslaughter section assumes that the
actor is normal and that his loss of self-control must be his own fault,
while the mental disease or defect section presupposes that the actor is
already suffering from a mental abnormality, and that his consequent lach
of self-control is not culpable. In fact, the reporter of the Model Penal
Code has advanced just such an argument in support of the exclusion of
recidivists from among the mentally diseased and the mentally defective.
He asserts that incapacity to conform must be distinguished from mere
41. Guttmacher, Principal Difficulties with the Present Criteria of Rezponssibilty and
Possible Alternatives, Model Penal Code app. B at 174-75 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
"Although it is possible and it may sometimes be useful to distinguih them, the fact is
that in normal persons the emotional, the cognitive, and the conative functions interpmetrate
one another." Hal, General Principles of Criminal Lax 494 (2d ed. 1960).
42. Second Report 19; Model Penal Code § 4.01, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
43. "[Tlhe very fact of long internal struggle may be evidence that the actor's homicidal
impulse was deeply aberrational, far more the product of extraordinary circumstances than
a true reflection of the actor's normal character .... " Mlodel Penal Code § 201.6, comment
3 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1959). It is perhaps significant that the proposed New Yorh: manslaughter section speaks only of emotional disturbance while its counterpart in the Model
Penal Code mentions mental or emotional disturbance. Does the excison of mental disturbance indicate that the Temporary Commission considered it a redundancy?
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indisposition and that "such a distinction is inevitable in the application
of a standard addressed to impairment of volition. ' 44
First of all, it seems quite doubtful that such a distinction can scientifically be made. As one eminent jurist has put it, "If there is an iota of
scientific evidence to sustain the distinction, surely it is not revealed.' 01
Thus, when courts have attempted to distinguish between heat of passion
and insane impulse, the results have been unenlightening to the point of
confusion.46 What it comes down to then is this: if the irresistible impulse
theory is to have any application at all, then, despite disclaimers to the
contrary,47 we must reason circularly from the impelled behavior to
mental disease to a lack of substantial ability to conform because of the
mental disease.4" "Sanity is then conceived as the ability to resist (antisocial) impulses."4 As a result, any theory leading to the exclusion of
certain irresistibly impelled behavior on account of its cause is untenable.
There is a second, and perhaps even more significant, reason to ignore
the cause of the absence of ability to conform, and look only to the psychological phenomenon itself. Every crime is composed of two elements,
the mens rea, the culpable state of mind, and the actus reus, the actual
"deed of crime," the presence of both being essential before particular
conduct may be labelled criminal." ° If the mental state required for a
particular crime is lacking, the crime has not been committed.5" The
mental element which concerns us here is the intent to kill. But one acting
under an irresistible impulse is not acting volitionally and, hence, his
act is not intentional, 2 and this is so regardless of the cause of his lack
44. Model Penal Code § 4.01, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). One commentator
has argued that the purported exclusion of psychopaths is actually illusory. Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 608, 626 (1963).
45. Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It, 49
A.B.A.J. 1075, 1077 (1963).
46. Glueck, Law and Psychiatry 50-51 (1962); Perkins 757-58.
47. Second Report 21-22.
48. Wootton, Social Science and Social Pathology 233 (1959); see State v. Lucas, 30
N.J. 37, 70-71, 152 A.2d 50, 67-68 (1959). Professor Allen may be saying the same thing
when he interprets the Model Penal Code test to include "those whose mental condition
renders them incapable of appreciating the criminality of their conduct or of conforming
their behavior to the law's commands." Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 494, 500 (1962). Note that emphasis Is placed on
symptomatic "mental condition," not on collaterally diagnosed "mental disease or defect."
49. Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry 131 (1963).
50. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 908 (1939). The offense
malum prohibitum is not an exception because it is not a "crime." See Model Penal Code
§ 1.05, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); Perkins 701-02.
51. Weihofen & Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale
L.J. 959, 962 (1947).
52. Id. at 979; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. Pa.
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of substantial capacity to resist."a Because he cannot entertain the requisite intent to kill, mens rea is lacking and there has been no crime.
No supportable distinction can be made between the incapacitated and
the indisposed. The irresistible impulse test requires, rather, that we
ignore the cause of the impulse and exculpate the actor solely on the
basis of the phenomenon itself. Accordingly, the manslaughter and mental
disease or defect sections are distinguishable only by the extent to which
the volitional capacity has been diminished. Since the latter section contemplates the absence of substantial capacity to conform, the former
must assume the presence of such capacity.
In order to distinguish murder from manslaughter, must we now surrender to further psychiatric delvings into the mind in order to determine
whether the actor had a complete or only a substantial capacity to choose?
I hope not. I think we do no particular injustice when we treat as a
murderer the killer who, with a substantial capacity to choose, elects to
kill. On the other hand, to attempt to differentiate between the substantial
and the complete would require us, in all fairness, to refine our distinctions
to include the little-more-than-substantial and the almost-complete. Punishment for the little-more-than-substantial would necessarily be less
severe than for the almost-complete and so on. Psychiatry is still a long
way from achieving such mathematical certainty, 4 and to require "psychiatrists ... to give degrees and percentages of responsibility.., would
be a travesty. ' 'as
In summary, section 130.20(2) is objectionable because it is vague and
ambiguous. In addition, the irresistible impulse defense, as formulated
and proposed, seems to cover all the situations wherein it is desirable
and possible to take notice of a diminished capacity to conform to law50
L. Rex. 956, 9S6-37 (1952). To put it another way, the accused must have been competent
to make a moral decision. Hall, P-ychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 Yale LJ. 761,
770 (1956). Presumably, if he lacks volitional capacity to a substantial extent, he lacks the
competence to make a moral decision.
53. Over sixty years ago, an Iowa court held that an irresistible impulse to steal vas a
defense to a prosecution for larceny, even though the impulse was inspired by avarice or
greed. The court found that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury to distinguish
between an impulse caused by greed and one caused by insanity. State v. McCullough, 114
Iowa 532, 87 NAV 503 (1901).
54. See Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibiity- M"aghten Versus Durham
and the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft, 33 Ind. LJ.212, 219 (1958).
55. Guttmacher, op. cit. supra note 41, at 176.
5
56. I do not mean that I espouse, without reservation, the Temporary Commsion's
version of the irresistible impulse defense. However, the enactment of the precent version,
or one closely akin to it, seems inevitable. The Temporary Commission has reported that
fruitful discussions have occurred between the State District Attorneys' Association and the
Commission concerning controversial aspects of the proposed defense and that these dis-
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Sections 130.20(2) and 130.25(1)(a) should be eliminated from the
proposed penal law.
B. Homicide Resulting From an Act Intended
To Do Serious Bodily Harm
An inexcusable and unjustifiable killing directly resulting from a coldblooded assault with intent to do serious bodily harm is not murder in
any degree under existing New York murder statutes.67 As a matter of
fact, such a homicide, qua homicide, may not be unlawful at all. It is
clear that an unintentional killing, committed during the heat of passion,
is manslaughter. If such killing is perpetrated by means of a dangerous
weapon or in a cruel and unusual manner, it is manslaughter in the first
degree.5 Absent both these factors, it is manslaughter in the second
degree. 9 On the other hand, it seems equally clear that heat of passion
is an affirmative element of the crimeY0 It is probable, therefore, that
even though all of the other elements of the crime are present, a failure
to prove heat of passion will preclude guilt of either degree of manslaughter."'
It is this gap in the existing statutes which is intended to be filled by
proposed section 130.20(1):
cussions "augur well for future submission of a mutually acceptable bill closely resembling
the [presently proposed] one ....
" Third Report 15. As yet, no new proposal has been
made public.
57. It is not intentional murder, N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 1044(1), 1046, because intent to
kill is lacking; it is not felony murder, N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044(2), because the assault
merges into the homicide. People v. Hiter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906) ; and It Is not
depraved mind murder, N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044(2), because the assault has been directed
against a particular person. See pp. 185-86, 197 infra.
58. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1050(2).
59. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1052(2).
60. People v. D'Andrea, 26 Misc. 2d 95, 102, 207 N.Y.S.2d 215, 223-24 (Kings County
Ct. 1960); see cases collected in Homicide Report 204.
61. Second Report 39-40. The argument might well be made that the crime is manslaughter in the second degree within the omnibus provision of N.Y. Pen. Law § 1052(3),
which covers an unlawful homicide committed "by an act, procurement or culpable negligence of any person, which, according to the provisions of this article, does not constitute the
crime of murder in the first or second degree, nor manslaughter in the first degree." But
then we are confronted with the problem of explaining the existence of § 1052(2), which
would be rendered entirely superfluous by including such homicides in § 1052(3). The argument might continue that geople v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927), stands for
the proposition that there can be no gaps in our homicide statutes and, therefore, a coldblooded assault resulting in death must fit into some category of murder or manslaughter.
However, it must be remembered that the court of appeals in Angelo was excluding reprehensible conduct (ordinary negligence) from penal sanction. Quite a different approach Is
to be expected when the court is confronted with the necessity of filling a gap by creating
a crime when the statutes seem to provide for none.
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A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person ....
c2

This section, which seems straightforward enough, replaces present
sections 1050(2) and 1050(3) and adequately fills the outstanding gap
by omitting any reference to heat of passion. It is gratifying to note
that no provision is made for mitigation on account of the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance. It would seem, however, that the absence
of such a provision creates somewhat of an inconsistency between
proposed sections 130.20(1) and 130.20(2) which can easily be corrected by omitting the latter section.
C. Depraved Mind Homicide
The common law classified as murder a homicide resulting from conduct which carried with it an extreme risk of causing death, and the
doing of which was said to evince a depraved heart, regardless of human
life."3 "The examples of such cases usually given as illustrations in the
[classic common law] texts were: shooting a gun into a crowd, driving
a horse into a crowd and rolling a rock or heavy object off a roof, causing
it to fall into a well traveled thoroughfare.""
The depraved mind concept was absorbed into the New York Penal
Law as a species of first degree murder:
The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in
the first degree, when committed: ...
2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life, although without a premeditated design to effect the
death of any individual ....

65

In the leading case of Darry v. People,"' it was settled that the phrases,
"dangerous to others" and "regardless of human life" were intended to
62. Physical injury '"means pain of a substantial nature, or any illness or impairment of
physical condition." Proposed Pen. Law § 10.00(3). Serious physical injury "means physical
injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily organ." Proposed Pen. Law § 10.00(4).
63. Moreland 31. Terminology used to describe the mens rea attendant upon such conduct
has included such epithets as "a wicked heart," "a mind grievously depraved, "dang2rous as
a wild beast." Homicide Report 10S.
64. Id. at 103. (Citations omitted.)
65. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044(2). Section 1044(4) provides that a homicide, which remults
from willful interference with railroad property, is murder in the first degree. It would sceni
that such conduct evinces a depraved indifference to human life and should fall within the
scope of section 1044(2). For a brief discussion and rationale of railroad homicide, sce
Homicide Report 1S7.
66. 10 N.X. 120 (1354).
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indicate conduct endangering others than the victim, and not specifically
directed at the victim; thus, neither violence aimed at a particular individual nor violence endangering only one person falls within the scope
of depraved mind murder. On the other hand, conduct, which has been
said to fall within the scope of the statute, has ranged from indiscriminate
shooting68 to the sale of wood alcohol with knowledge that it was poisonous and that the purchaser intended to resell it as gin.69
1. "Wantonness" as the Key
In its 1937 survey of the law of homicide in New York, the Law Revision Commission found a diversity of opinion among the early authorities as to the precise nature of the mens rea and actus reus of depravity.7 0
Nevertheless, Professor Moreland has concluded that the gravamen of
the crime is a species of negligence, though more aggravated than that
required for both the tortious failure to exercise reasonable care and
the recklessness needed for the crime of manslaughter. 71 Professors
Wechsler and Michael seem to be in accord when they identify the crime
as one of "extremely gross recklessness. 72 Of course, we must have a
more precise definition than this, and Professor Moreland has proposed
that we describe the actor's aggravated negligence as "conduct wantonly
disregardful of the lives and safety of others,"73 while Professor Perkins
suggests the phrase "wanton and wilful disregard of unreasonable human
74

risk."

67. "It must be dangerous to others. The plural form is used; and though I am aware
that, by a general provision of the revised statutes, the plural may be construed to Include
the singular, I conceive, that where a precise definition was intended, and where the distinction between general and particular malice must have been in the mind of the legislature, the
case of imminent danger to the person killed would have been specified, had it been intended
to embrace it. . . The act must evince a depraved mind, regardless of human life. These
words are exactly descriptive of general malice, and cannot be fairly applied to any affection
of the mind, having for its object a particular individual . . . ." Id. at 155. (Emphasis
omitted.) Accord, People v. Ludkowitz, 266 N.Y. 233, 194 N.E. 688 (1935). Before Darry
v. People, supra note 66, it had been held that a homicide resulting from specifically directed
violence was not necessarily excluded from the statute. See Homicide Report 112-14.
68. People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
69. People v. Voelker, 220 App. Div. 528, 221 N.Y. Supp. 760 (4th Dep't 1927) (dictum).
A collection of New York cases appears in Homicide Report 126-27. For brief surveys of
the law of depraved mind murder in other jurisdictions, see Model Penal Code § 201.2, comment 2, app. C (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Moreland 213-16.
70. Homicide Report 104-11.
71. Moreland 32.
72. Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 709
(1937).
73. Moreland 33-34.
74. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale L.J. 537, 555-57 (1934).
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Despite the similarity in their terminologies, Moreland and Perkins
mean two different things by the word "wanton." Perkins believes that
it "goes beyond negligence in any degree,1 7G while Moreland sees it as
a "still higher degree of negligence." 70 The mutual choice of the word
wanton is salutary, but Professor Moreland's continued classification of
the conduct as a species of negligence is not. Wantonness has a meaning
of its own in the law, representing something quite distinct from both
gross negligence (recklessness) and specific intent, although it seems
closer, in degree of moral culpability, to intent. Professor Perkins defines
it as follows:
Wanton misconduct 'is
something different from negligence however gross-different
not merely in degree but in kind, and evincing a different state of mind," so callously
heedless of harmful consequences known to be likely to follow that "even though
there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious
indifference to the perpetration of the wrong." While an intent to do an unlawful
act in wanton disregard of the foreseen likelihood of harm may differ little in the
scale of moral blameworthiness from actual intent to cause such harm it is not
the same state of mind and should not be confused therewith, although it may be
permissible to characterize it as "equivalent in spirit to actual intent.' 7

Viewing the depraved mind as sni gecris solves several problems.
First of all, it should provide sufficient answer to those who object to
the delineation of yet another degree of negligence where no such delinea-

tion is feasible.s Secondly, the characterization of wantonness as "equivalent in spirit to actual intent" goes a long way toward justifying the

identity of punishment for intentional and depraved mind murder. 0
Finally, we must have a way of verbalizing the somewhat difficult and

subtle distinction between a depraved mind and a merely reckless mind,81
and wantonness provides the means of articulation.
75. Perkins 61; see Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 Ior L.
Rev. 325, 362-63 (1964).
76. Moreland 35; see Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law with Recommendations, 51
Ky. L.J. 59, 68-69 (1962).
77. Perkins 691. (Citations omitted.)
78. "Shadowy enough and uncertain is the dividing line between ordinary and gross
negligence. Should a further distinction be necessitated by the addition of another overtone
scarcely audible even to trained ears-the creation of very gross negligence?" Homicide Report 131.
79. Professor Moreland, for instance, urges that depraved mind murder zhould be
classified as murder in the second degree. Moreland 309. Since he views the crime as a
species of aggravated negligence, he logically concludes that it should be subject to lezer
punishment than intentional murder. Id. at 312.
So. "The distinction between the negligence necessary for this crime [depraved mind
murder] and culpable negligence is often difficult to perceive. Wherein lies the difference between an act which evinces a disregard of its consequences and indifference to the rights of
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2. The Proposed Statute
Depraved mind murder enters the proposed penal law in the following
form:
A person is guilty of murder when: ...
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct involving a grave risk of human fatality and thereby causes
the death of another person .... 81

"Recklessly" is defined as follows:
A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk (a) that the result described by a statute defining an offense will occur,
or (b) that a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense exists, and
when the disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.8 2

A merely reckless act which causes death constitutes the crime of manslaughter in the second degree.8 3
Both the text of the proposed depraved mind murder statute and the
commission staff comments indicate that recklessness is the gravamen of
the offense.84 In this respect, the formulation seems to coincide with the
Moreland view that the crime is a species of negligence, and to be at
odds with the Perkins view that it is sui generis. However, it is probable
that just the opposite was intended. To begin with, the proposed penal
law provides the same punishment for both intentional murder and depraved mind murder. It would seem, therefore, that the mens rea of
depravity should, as Professor Perkins puts it, "differ little in the scale
of moral blameworthiness from actual intent,"", and, in fact, should be
"equivalent in spirit to actual intent."8 0 Therefore, the reasonable man
others and one that 'evinces a depraved mind, regardless of human life'?" 6 Fordham L. Rev.
309, 310 (1937).
81. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25(2).
82. Proposed Pen. Law § 45.00(6).
83. "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: 1. He recklessly
causes the death of another person .

. . ."

Proposed Pen. Law § 130.15.

84. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25(2), Commission Staff Notes, refer to the crime as "the
highest crime of reckless homicide."
85. Perkins 691.
86. Ibid. Model Penal Code § 210.2 (Off. Draft 1962), defines murder, in part, as follows:
"(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1) (b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." The reporter's
comments to the section emphasize the equivalence in spirit of "purposely or knowingly"
and "extreme indifference": "Paragraph (1) (b) reflects the judgment that there is a kind of
reckless homicide that cannot fairly be distinguished for this purpose from homicides committed purposely or knowingly. .

.

. Since risk

. . .

is a matter of degree and the motives for

risk creation may be infinite in variation, some formula is needed to identify the case where
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should not be a part of the definition of depravity any more than he is
a part of the definition of intent."
There is yet another reason for discarding the assumption that the intended gist of the offense is negligence. If the standard were an objective
one, then relevant evidence of depravity would, typically, be limited
to external manifestations of unreasonableness (the gravity of the risk
and the nature of defendant's conduct), and to the subjective consciousness of risk (solely because it is part of the definition of "recklessly").
But the proposed section would admit of all such proof even in the
absence of the phrase, "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life." In fact, the phrase would become inexplicable since
the word, "circumstances," if it were to have any meaning at all, would
necessarily refer to irrelevant evidence. The better interpretation is that
a subjective standard was intended. I propose that we define this standard as "a willingness that death should occur." It seems to me that
such a state of mind is truly equivalent in spirit to actual intent. This is
not to say that reasonableness will not enter into the jury's deliberations.
[W]e cannot directly apprehend the states of others' minds and must rely on
observable data to know them, and . . . in the interpretation of such data, the

degree of risk supports an inference as to intention, recklessness or negligence....

[But we must not confuse] a mental state with the proof of its existence . . .
[or imply] that the risk suggested by the immediate behavior and situation is the
only, or decisive, way of establishing the relevant mental state8 8

Discarding an objective standard in favor of a subjective one opens
a wider scope of inquiry at a depraved-mind-murder trial, and lends
meaning to the phrase, "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life." The motive of the actor-something which
would be ignored entirely if we were to apply a standard of reasonableness to conscious risk-taking-becomes highly significant. For instance,
a lawyer, who drives his car through a school zone at high speed during
recess because he is late for a calendar call, may be conscious of the risk
of a fatal accident, but has probably convinced himself that he can
avoid it. On the other hand, an escaping felon might very well prefer a
fatal accident to being caught. The lawyer is reckless but the felon is
recklessness should be assimilated to purpose or knowledge. The conception that the draft
employs is that of extreme indifference to the value of human life.' Model Penal Code
§ 201.2, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
87. "A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct deccribcd by a
statute defining an offense, when his conscious object is to cause that result or to engage in
that conduct." Proposed Pen. Law § 45.00(4).
88. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 113 (2d ed. 1960); see Kenny, Outlines of
Criminal Law 35 (17th ed. Turner 1953).
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depraved. Similarly, the conduct of the marksman, who shoots at a
target on the edge of a roof overlooking a crowded stadium, may be said
to deviate grossly from the standard of conduct of the reasonable man,
and to involve a grave risk of human fatality, but the marksman may
have convinced himself that he will not miss. The sniper who, deliberately
and indiscriminately, shoots from the roof into the bleachers has engaged
in no such rationalization. The marksman is reckless but the sniper is
depraved. Aside from evidence of motive, evidence of intoxication would
become relevant if the test were put in subjective terms and not phrased
as recklessness. Under the proposed penal law, voluntary intoxication is
never a defense when recklessness is an element of the offense charged.8"
Yet, obviously, cases will arise when the intoxication is so intense that
there is not even a consciousness of risk, much less a willingness that
death should occur. In such instances it might be proper to convict the
actor of manslaughter in the second degree (reckless homicide), but it
would be extremely harsh, to say the least, to convict him of murder. °
What we must search for is not merely a consciousness of a grave risk
but, in addition, a full appreciation and comprehension of the nature and
gravity of the risk-a willingness that death should occur. Since such
an inquiry must be directed toward determining the actual Mnens rea
of the actor, the reference in the statute to recklessness, at best a mixed
subjective-objective concept, is self-defeating. An alternative formulation
is necessary but before proposing one, I should like to give attention to
another problem which may arise under the proposed statute.
The Temporary Commission has stated that the proposed depraved
mind murder section "is substantially a restatement of a similar crime
defined as first degree murder in the existing Penal Law [§ 1044(2)]."'
However, a colorable argument can be made that the omission from the
proposed section of the presently included phrase, "to others," brings
within the scope of the revision at least some homicides which result
from specifically directed violence. Certainly, if the actor can be depravedly indifferent to the lives of many, he can also be depravedly
89. Proposed Pen. Law § 45.10(2).
90. Apparently the theory of § 45.10(2) is that the actor is initially reckless in becoming
inebriated and that his recklessness is presumed to continue up to and including the timo of
the homicide. See Proposed Pen. Law § 45.10(2), Commission Staff Notes, An analogous
theory has been applied to epileptic drivers. See People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d
794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956). But the recklessness of both the drunk and the epileptic In-

evitably occurs at a time when the risk of causing a fatality is not immediate and thereforo
not grave. For instance, the drunk may have started drinking several hours before ho
fatally injures a pedestrian in an automobile accident.
91. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25(2), Commission Staff Notes.
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indifferent to the life of
The inquiry in such *a situation will still
focus upon the actor's state of mind. Consequently, the jury will refer
to such relevant factors as motive, knowledge of the victim's physical
condition, and the length and severity of the attack, as means of determining whether the actor intended to stop short of killing or whether
he was- quite willing that his victim should die, i.e., whether he has committed manslaughter or murder. 3
3. A Proposed Substitute Formulation
Wantonness should be substituted for recklessness as the szd generis
gravamen of the offense. Accordingly, I suggest that the following
definition of "wantonly" be added to section 45.005- of the proposed
law:
A person acts wantonly when he engages in conduct involving a grave risk of human
fatality under circumstances evincing a realization and appreciation of the nature
and gravity of the risk and a willingness that death should occur.

Section 130.25(2) would then read simply:
He wantonly causes the death of another.

D. Felony Mnrder
The felony murder doctrine apparently originated with the canonically
oriented Bracton who stated that culpability for a homicide by misadventure depended upon the lawfulness, or unlawfulness, of the venture
in which the actor was, at the time, engaged. 3 With the further developments of the common law, the principle evolved that a killing occurring
during the perpetration of a felony was murder. 0 Several theories were
advanced in rationalization of the doctrine. Under one the intent to
commit the underlying felony was, by implication of law, transferred to
92. See People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 534-35 (N.Y. CL Err. 1340).
93. As to manslaughter, see pp. 1S4-85 supra. In Massachusetts a homicide committed with
"extreme atrocity or cruelty" is murder in the first degree. Mass Gen. Laws ch. 26s, § 1

(1932). It is proposed here that cruelty and atrocity be considered merely as evidence of a
murderous mens rea.

94. This section defines the terms which "are applicable in the determination of culpability
requirements for offenses defined in" the proposed law. It includes definitions of act, omission, intentionally, knowingly and criminal negligence.
95. Moreland 42, 221; Binavince, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33
Fordham L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1964); Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commi- on of an
Unlawful Act, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1939).
96. Homicide Report 132-34; Moreland 42; Corcoran, Felony Murder in 'New York, 6
Fordham L. Rev. 43, 52 (1937). A homicide occurring during the commiAion of an unlawful
act, not a felony, is discussed at pp. 200-03 infra.
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the homicide, 97 while according to another the intent to kill or do serious
bodily injury was conclusively presumed from the commission of the
felony.98 The felony murder rule was, for some time, not seriously challenged, probably because the punishment for the underlying felony was,
more often than not, death and, as long as the felon was hanged, no one
particularly cared why. 99 However, in 1883, Judge Stephen launched a
blistering attack upon the cruelty and harshness of the rule, 100 and, in
Regina v. Sern,' 0' he implemented his views by holding that the act,
which resulted in death, must have been known to be dangerous to life,
likely in itself to cause death, and done for the purpose of effectuating the
underlying felony, and if all these factors were not present the homicide
was not murder. In effect, Stephen equated felony murder with depraved
mind murder. 102
Stephen's hard attitude toward felony murder did not remain the law.
Through a series of cases, it was modified to an objective formulation
which required only that the homicide result from an act of violence
committed during the perpetration of, and in furtherance of, a violent
felony. 103 According to this test, the mens rea of the actor, vis-ht-vis the
violent act which produced death, was irrelevant, 0 4 and Stephen's equation of felony murder with depraved mind murder was abandoned. In
1957, the pendulum swung the other way and, by statute, felony murder
was abolished in England, although it was provided that a murder (as
limited by the statute to exclude felony murder) was to be
a capital
0
offense if committed in the course or furtherance of a theft." 5
97. Homicide Report 134.
98. Id. at 135; Moreland 14. The conclusive presumption seems to have been based on
an inference that every felon was willing to kill since the victim of the felony bad a right to
defend himself, even to the point of killing the felon. See annotation to Regina v. Horsey, 3
Fost. & Fin. 287, 288, 176 Eng. Rep. 129, 130 (Nisi Prius 1862).
99. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 414, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901).
100. 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 57-75 (1883).
101. 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (1887).
102. Moreland 44; Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 Iowa L.
Rev. 325, 364 (1964).
103. Moreland 47-48. This statement of the rule is probably the best synthesis of the
cases, although other theories have been advanced from time to time. See Homicide Report
148-49.
104. See, e.g., Rex v. Elnick, [1921] 30 Man. 415, 53 D.L.R. 298 (1920) (accidental shooting during a robbery held felony murder regardless of the state of mind of the robber).
105. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11; see Model Penal Code § 201.2, comment 4C
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). For a commentary on the statute, see Prevezer, The English
Homicide Act: A New Attempt To Revise The Law of Murder, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 624
(1957).
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1. Felony Murder in New York
Felony murder is first degree murder in New York by virtue of the
following provision in section 1044:
The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the
first degree, when committed: ...
2..

.

.without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission

of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting the person klled
or otherwise ....s8
There are several reasons for concluding that the final phrase, "or
otherwise," in the statute brings within its scope all felonies which are
independent of the homicide, whether or not they are of the type that
usually breed violence. While the court of appeals has never been confronted with a case involving a non-violent felony, it has not hesitated
to state, in dictum, that "although most jurisdictions limit its application
to specified violent felonies (e.g., arson, rape, robbery and burglary),
New York and the minority make homicide during the commission of
any felony murder in the first degree .... .,"I"This dictum finds considerable support in the history of felony murder legislation in New York,
for although the statute at one time specifically enumerated the felonies
to which the doctrine applied, this enumeration was significantly omitted
when the present section was enacted.1 03 Finally, the leading authorities
are unanimously, albeit sometimes cautiously, in accord that all independent felonies are within the scope of the statute.""9
Not only is the New York felony murder statute indiscriminate with
respect to the kinds of felonies which fall within its scope, but apparently
it is almost as nonexclusive in selecting the kinds of homicidal acts
which, having occurred during the commission of, or attempt to commit
a felony, will support a first degree murder conviction. In People v.
Luscomb, n ° the court of appeals, in a four to three decision, affirmed
106. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044(2).
107. People v. Wood, S N.Y.2d 43, 51 n.2, 167 N.E.2d 736, 733 n.2, 201 N.YS.2d 328,
331 n.2 (1960) (dictum); accord, People v La Mlarca, 3 N.Y.2d 452, 144 N.E2d 420, 165
N.Y.S.2d 753 (1957) (dictum). In People v. Greenwall, 115 N.Y. 520, 22 N.E. 1X0 (1SS9),
the court rejected an argument that "otherwise" refers to other perzons and not to other
felonies. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1044(3) provides that an unjustifiable and inexcusable homidde
is murder when perpetrated while the actor is committing arson in the first degree. The
section has been said to be superfluous in view of the all-inclusivenezs of felony murder.
Homicide Report 1S6-87.
10S. See Corcoran, supra note 96, at 55, for a brief review of the legislative history.
109. See, e.g., Homicide Report 139; Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine
and Its Application Under The New York Statutes, 20 Cornell L.Q. 253, 294 (1935);
Corcoran, supra note 96, at 54-55; Wechsler & Michael, supra note 72, at 715.
110. 292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944).
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a conviction of murder in the first degree (felony murder), even though
the defendant's homicidal act had not been committed in furtherance of
the underlying felony. Defendant had been interrupted in an assault upon
his wife by her father. He then commenced a new assault upon the
latter, and while that felony was in progress, shot and killed his wife. The
majority of the court of appeals considered it irrelevant that the homicide
had not been committed in furtherance of the felony (just the opposite
was true), and held that the mere contemporaneity of the two was sufficient."' Despite broad language in the decision pointing toward the
determinative significance of contemporaneity, it is colorably arguable
that the case must be limited on its facts to circumstances which demonstrate a close connection between the felony and the homicide.
A corollary to the Luscomb decision is the rejection of the rule of
some jurisdictions that the homicide must be the natural and probable
consequence of the felony."' It seems logical to assume, therefore, that
contemporaneity and close connection are all that need be found in
order to place the felon's homicidal act"l within the operation of the
felony murder statute. Specifically, a killing, which might otherwise have
been deemed excusable homicide, i.e., caused by an unavoidable accident,
might, in conjunction with these other factors, be considered murder in
the first degree."14 The innocuousness of the act itself would seem to be
entirely irrelevant since New York rationalizes its felony murder doctrine, not on any theory of risk of death, but on the basis of transferred
intent." ' The underlying felony supplies the requisite mens rea; the
111. "Mere contemporaneity between the homicide and the felony is not sufficient to
spell out felony murder. There must be a causal connection between the two. The homicide
must have resulted from an act performed in execution and in furtherance of the felony.
As the dissenting opinion well pointed out, even if it be assumed that the assault upon the
father was still in progress at the time the killing took place, it is clear that the act of
shooting the wife was not in any way committed in execution and in furtherance of any
assault on the father. On the contrary, the evidence apparently credited by the jury Indicates, if anything, that the allegedly continuing assault on the father was in furtherance
of the defendant's design to prevent any interference by the father in the defendant's assault upon his wife." 13 Fordham L. Rev. 243, 247-48 (1944). (Footnotes omitted.)
112. See Corcoran, supra note 96, at 65; Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-Murder
Rule, 1952 Wash. U.L.Q. 191.
113. The act which produces death must be the act of one of the felons. People v. Wood,
8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960).
114. There are no New York cases in point. In People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E.
290 (1931), and People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930), it was held that a
homicide resulting from the accidental discharge of a gun by one of the felons was felony
murder. However, in each of these cases, as in People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d
469 (1944), a contributing cause of the death was the dangerous use of the gun as a weapon.
115. People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960); People v.
Luscomb, supra note 114.
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homicidal act becomes tainted with guilt, and the killing is presumed
to be the actus reus of murder, the physical implementation of the nzens
rea.116 In short, the homicide will be murder in the first degree as long
as it is caused by the felon in the immediate vicinity of the independent
felony, and while he is in the process of committing or attempting to
commit the felony.
If the New York felony murder doctrine is broadly inclusive of
felonies and homicidal acts, it is limited in other ways. The act which
produces death must be the act of one of the felons. 7 Accomplices are
equally guilty of felony murder though they be absent from the scene
of the felony,"' though there be an express agreement not to kill, °
and though the actual killer be deemed legally incapable of the crime.'! "
On the other hand, accomplices share no guilt for a killing which is not
committed in pursuit and furtherance of the common felonious design,'
or which is committed after they have effectively abandoned the enterprise.Y- If one of the felons accidently kills himself, his accomplices are
not thereby culpable.'2 3 Other limitations have been set by cutting short
the duration of the felony" 4 and by excluding flight from the res gestac
of the felony.' 5
While any one of these limitations may operate to exculpate a defendant in a given case, nevertheless, the New York felony murder
doctrine retains a generally broad base. The revision, proposed by the
116. Professor Norval Mlorris argues that the doctrine of implied malice bear only on
the mens rea of murder and not upon the actus reus of homicide. Morris, The Felon's
Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50, 59 (1956). However,
his reasoning does not apply in a jurisdiction which has abandoned the natural and probable
consequences rule.
117. People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 43, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 X.YS.2d 328 (1960).
118. People v. Mlichalow, 229 N.Y. 325, 12S N.E. 223 (1920).
119. People v. Friedman, 205 N.Y. 161, 165-66, 93 N.E. 471, 473 (1912).
120. People v. Porter, 54 N.Y.S.2d 3 (King County Ct. 1945) (actual killer incapable of
committing a felony because of his age). In a reverse twist, the court of appmls in People v.
Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 4S9 (1930), affirmed convictions for felony murder based
on a homicide which occurred during a jail break, even though one of the defendant-appellants, as a life prisoner, was not within the scope of the statute which made cuch an ezcape
a felony under specified circumstances. The court found that he had acted on bhhalf of other
escapees who were covered by the statute and, thus, had become a principal in their felonies.
121. People v. Wood, 3 N.Y.2d 43, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1960).
122. People v. Lunse, 278 N.Y. 303, 16 N.E.2d 345 (1933).
123. People v. LaBarbera, 159 Misc. 177, 237 N.Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1936). If hovever, one of the felons accidentally kills a co-felon, all of the felons are guilty of felony
murder. People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 4S9 (1930).
124. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 232 N.Y. 239, 133 N.E. 574 (1921); People v. Hfter, 134
N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906).
125. People v. Collins, 234 N.Y. 355, 137 N.E. 753 (1922); People v. Mart, g, 227 N.Y.
382, 125 N.E. 535 (1919).
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Temporary Commission, would narrow the base; however, the efforts
of the Commission in this direction, though ingenious, only serve to
emphasize the fundamental indefensibility of the felony murder doctrine.
2. The Proposed Statute
The text of the proposed felony murder statute is as follows:
A person is guilty of murder when: ...
3. Either alone or in concert with others, he commits or attempts to commit
a felonious crime of robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, escape or a forcible,
felonious sex crime, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of
the immediate flight of the perpetrators thereof or any one of them, one or more
commits an act inherently dangerous to human life which causes the death of a
person other than one of the perpetrators; except that it shall constitute an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this subdivision that a defendant, though a participant in the underlying felony:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, counsel,
encourage, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with any deadly weapon, or any implement, article
or substance capable of inflicting serious injury and of a sort not ordinarily
carried about in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c) Did not know that any of his confederates was armed with such a
weapon, implement, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any of his120confederates
intended to commit an act inherently dangerous to human life.

In one respect the revision broadens the felony murder doctrine by
including immediate flight within the res gestae of the felony. 7 On the
other hand the area of accomplice-culpability is limited, first, by "extending
a defendant an opportunity to fight his way out of a felony murder charge
by persuading a jury, by way of affirmative defense, that he not only had
nothing to do with the killing itself but was unarmed and had no idea
that any of his confederates was armed or intended to engage in any
conduct dangerous to life,"' 12 and second, by completely excluding from
the operation of the section the death of a co-felon. In all other respects
the section is closely akin to the felony murder doctrine as it existed
in England immediately prior to the Homicide Act of 1957.12' It requires
126. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25(3).
127. "[T]he crime is broadened to cover killings committed during 'immediate flight'
from the underlying felony. The existing law, strictly limiting felony murder to homicides
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the felony, is, in the Commission's opinion,
unduly restrictive." Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25(3), Commission Staff Notes.
128. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25(3), Commission Staff Notes. (Emphasis added.) Once
evidence has been presented which raises an issue concerning the existence of an affirmative
defense, the burden is placed upon the people to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no
such defense exists. Proposed Pen. Law § 55.00.
129. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11; see p. 192 infra.
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that the homicide result from a violent act (inherently dangerous to
human life) committed in the course of, and in furtherance of, a presumptively violent felony. In addition, culpability is oriented to reasonable foreseeability, not to individual viens rea.130
The emphasis placed upon the foreseeability of risk to human life
demonstrates an attempt by the Temporary Commission to close the gap
between the mens rea of the felon and the actus rcus of homicide which,
as of now, need not concur-as in the case of an accidental homicide
contemporaneous with, and closely related to, the felony. Despite the
attempt, a substantial gap remains, and there is still no necessary correlation between mens rea and actus rens. The crimes of arson and
robbery are presumptively violent but, as has been pointed out, they
may be committed "safely" and with no thought of violence.111 On the
other hand, a typically violent felony, aggravated assault, is omitted
from the list," - and, logically, it must be so excluded or every homicide
resulting from such an assault would become felony murder. From the
point of view, therefore, of either inclusion or omission, the mere enumeration of violent felonies is inadequate to reflect mens rca. The statute,
however, requires more than a violent felony. It requires that the homicide result from an act inherently dangerous to human life. Does this
additional requisite solve the problem? Manifestly it does not because
it is indiscriminate with respect to violent acts. Pointing a gun during a
robbery is probably an inherently dangerous act' and, if the gun goes
off accidentally, a felony murder has occurred. 13 But such an accident
can hardly be equal in culpability to a homicide which results from
placing a gas tube under the nose of a bound robbery victim "to make
her sleep" while the felons make their escape."" Even if we were to
130. "The purpose of the indicated limitations is to exclude rare instances of accidental
or not reasonably foreseeable fatality, and especially those which might happen to occur in
a most unlikely manner in the course of a non-violent felony.- Proposed Pen. Law § 130.25
(3), Commission Staff Notes.
131. Wechsler & Aichael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701,

714 (1937); Note, 66 Yale Lj. 427, 434-35 (1957).
132. It has been held that when an assault culminates in a homicide, the former merges
into the latter and, hence, the homicide cannot be said to have occurred while the defendant
was engaged in committing the separate felony of assault. People N%Moran, 246 N.Y. 100,
15 N.E. 35 (1927); People v. Hilter, 134 N.Y. 237, 77 NE. 6 (1906). If, however, independent assaults are committed on two or more persons, one of the assaults may become
the underlying felony for the homicide which results from the other. See People v. Luscomb,
292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944) ; People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927).
133. Corcoran, supra note 96, at 47-43.
134. See Rex v. Elnick, (1921] 30 Mlan. 415, 53 D.L.R. 293 (1920).
135. Ibid.
136. These were the facts in People v. Mlichaloxv, 229 N.Y. 323, 128 N.E. 228 (1920).
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concede arguendo that the combination of violent act in furtherance of
violent felony evidences what Professor Perkins has called "a manendangering-state-of-mind,' 8 7 still it fails to take into account that there
are different degrees of culpability within such a state of mind.' 88
Other formulations, which have recently been devised, are equally objectionable. The Model Penal Code attempts to solve the problem by
raising a rebuttable presumption that the homicidal felon has manifested
"extreme indifference to... human life."'18 9 Presumptions of fact are not
unknown to the criminal law. We presume that the actor who grievously
and mortally wounds another had intended the natural and probable
consequences (death) of his act.140 Again, a factual inference of larcenous
intent arises from recent, conscious, exclusive, and unexplained possession
of stolen articles.' In each of these instances, however, the facts, which
must be present to raise the presumption of a specific intent, point
inexorably toward the existence of that intent. A homicide, resulting
from an inherently dangerous act committed in furtherance of a violent
felony, is equally consistent with depravity, intent, recklessness, and
negligence, and no valid factual inference of a specific Mens rea may
be drawn. Unsatisfactory too is a Wisconsin statute which places felony
murder in a separate category of third degree murder. 1 42 Here again
there is an arbitrary identification and classification of mens rea. Felony
murder is first degree murder in Minnesota only when the homicide
results from the commission, or attempted commission, of a forcible
sex crime. 48 While this may be the most sophisticated of refinements, it
is still objectionable because it does not take into account actual intent,
and it would presumably include death resulting from fright or accident. 44 Moreover, it is the physical assault, not the sexual intercourse,

which ordinarily presents the greater danger of death and, as with the
proposed New York revision, a homicide resulting from an assault is
not, and cannot be, within the scope of the statute.
All of the objections to the various felony murder formulations which
have been discussed above may be distilled into one major criticism:
the doctrine works an injustice because it fails to correlate the nens rea
137. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale L.J. 537, 557 (1934).
138. See Note, supra note 131, at 431-35.
139. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (Off. Draft 1962).
140. See People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 54 N.E.2d 357 (1944).
141. People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556, 225 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1962).
142. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.03 (1958). For a survey of felony murder in various Jurisdictions, see Model Penal Code § 201.2, comment 4 & app. C (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
143. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.185 (1963).
144. Cf. Perkins, supra note 137, at 558.
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of the actor with the act for which he is held culpable and the degree
of punishment which may be inflicted upon him. " While modem codes
have narrowed the mens rea gap, it still exists to a substantial extent
because it inheres necessarily in any felony murder statute which employs
an objective test to determine the mens rea of the felon vis-Lt-vis the
homicide.14 Continued adherence to the doctrine is undesirable, not only
because it is manifestly unjust to the defendant, but also because it has
no utilitarian value. The felony murder doctrine was not conceived as
a deterrent and it does not operate as such. 17 If rehabilitation, and not
deterrence, is the purpose of punishment, then let the felon be 1reformed
while he is detained upon conviction of the underlying felony. 19
The felony murder doctrine works an injustice to the felon with no
corresponding benefit to society. Section 130.25(3) should be omitted
from the proposed penal law.
E. Homicide While Opposing an Arrest
A homicide, which resulted from forcible opposition to an officer
making a lawful arrest, was murder at common law. Stephen gives this
illustration: "A, a thief, pursued by B, a policeman, who wishes to arrest
A, trips up B, who is accidentally killed. A commits murder."1 19 If all
the circumstances remained the same except that the arrest was illegal,
then the resulting homicide was voluntary manslaughter-a provoked
killing in the heat of passion.1 °
Killing an officer is not a separate species of culpable homicide in
New York, but, of course, it may fall within one of the delineated degrees of
murder or manslaughter, depending upon the circumstances of the
homicide and the mens rea of the actor. On the other hand, the mere
circumstance of forcible resistance, culminating in the death of an
officer, will not support a charge of felony murder. Although forcibly
resisting lawful arrest is a felony in New York,' it has been held that
the gist of the crime is assault and that the assault merges into the
resulting homicide. 2 No attempt has been made to revive this form of
145. See Note, supra note 131.
146. See Perldns, supra note 102, at 364-69. Of course, if a subjective test is employed,
the doctrine become superfluous. See discussion of Regina v. Sern, p. 192 supra.
147. See Crum, supra note 112, at 210; Note, 31 Ind. L.. 534, 544 n.6O (1956).
14S. If the homicide has resulted from an act intended to hill or to do great bodily harm,
or from wantonness or recklessness, then the felon is also subject to punihment for murder
or manslaughter as the case may be.
149. Stephen 183. A lawful arrest was not the only official act so protected. Id. at 183.
150. Id. at 1S6.
151. N.Y. Pen. Law § 242(5).
152. People v. Hiter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906). As to the merger of =azult and
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common law murder in the proposed penal law, nor is forcible opposition
to an officer included among the list of violent felonies, during the commission, or attempted commission, of which a felony murder may occur.
It has been held in New York that one is justified in using reasonable
force to resist an unlawful arrest,153 and it would seem to follow that if
death results from the use of such force, no culpable homicide has occurred. In the proposed penal law, resistance to unlawful arrest is expressly made to fall within the affirmative defense of justification.5 4
F. Misdemeanor Manslaughter
At common law, the actor who caused a homicide while he was engaged
in the commission of an act malum in se, but not felonious, was guilty
of manslaughter if a causal connection could be established between the
unlawful act and the homicide.' 55 Like the felony murder rule, the misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine had its genesis in Bracton's thesis that
a homicide by misadventure was culpable if it occurred while the killer
was engaged in the commission of an unlawful act1 6 In Bracton's time,
homicide had not yet been divided into murder and manslaughter.", At
the present time in New York, we have not only made the division, but
we have also trichotomized Bracton's unlawful act principle into felony
murder, which we have already discussed, misdemeanor manslaughter,
and civil-wrong manslaughter. Both of the manslaughter categories have
been eliminated in the proposed penal law. The death knell of civil wrong
manslaughter 5" does not really sound a change in the law, since there
have been no reported convictions of this crime. On the other hand, the
misdemeanor manslaughter section has been the subject of interesting,
and sometimes anomalous, judicial interpretation.
homicide, see note 132 supra. Resisting a public officer in the discharge of his duties Is also
a misdemeanor in New York, N.Y. Pen. Law § 1851, and the misdemeanor does not necessarily merge with the assault on the officer. People v. Lasko, 43 Misc. 2d 693, 252 N.Y.S.2d
209 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1964). A homicide resulting from resistance to an officer might,
therefore, constitute misdemeanor manslaughter.
153. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954).
154. Proposed Pen. Law § 65.25.
155. Perkins 56-60; see Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful Act, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 811 (1939). For a brief statutory survey of manslaughter, see
Model Penal Code § 201.3, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
156. Moreland 183.
157. Id. at 184.
158. "Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree, when committed without a
design to effect death: 1. By a person committing or attempting to commit a trespass, or
other invasion of a private right, either of the person killed, or of another, not amounting
to a crime . . . ." N.Y. Pen. Law § 1052.
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Misdemeanor manslaughter is presently defined as follows:
Such homicide is manslaughter in the first degree, when committed vithout a

design to effect death:

1. By a person engaged in committing, or attempting to commit, a misdemeanor,
affecting the person or property, either of the person killed, or of another .... 1C

Not every misdemeanor falls within the section. Rather, it is limited
to those "affecting the person or property, either of the person killed
or of another," and to this extent misdemeanor manslaughter is less
inclusive than felony murder. However, the exact scope of the statute
is by no means apparent. The legislature has made no attempt to enumerate the included misdemeanors, and the description, "affecting
person or property," does not create a well-delineated classification.
Every misdemeanor which results in death "affects" the person. The
intended criterion must be narrower than this, and People v. Griecolc
gives us some indication of what it should be. Grieco had been convicted
of manslaughter in the first degree for causing a homicide while committing
the misdemeanors of reckless driving and driving while intoxicated. 10 ' The
court of appeals reversed and decided that it was improper to use hindsight in determining whether the offense was one affecting the person.1
"Defendant did not intentionally hit the deceased. He did not see her
until the very instant of contact." " 3 In requiring not merely a misdemeanor, but also a guilty mind, the court was adhering at least to the
spirit of the common law requirement that the underlying offense be
malum in se.
Grieco might thus have settled matters were it not for People v. Nelsoiz. 04 The underlying misdemeanor in that case was a violation of
certain sections of the Multiple Dwelling Law pertaining to the installation of fire protection devices."'0 As a direct result of the defendant's
failure to install required safety devices, two of his tenants had perished
in a fire. This violation of the Multiple Dwelling Law was viewed by
a majority of the court of appeals as a continuing misdemeanor affecting
the person and property of his tenants, and his conviction of misdemeanor
manslaughter was affirmed.
159. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1050.
160. 266 N.Y. 4S, 193 N.E. 634 (1934). In People v. Grieco, the court of appeals gave
de novo treatment to misdemeanor manslaughter. Any developmental analysis of the present
state of the crime in New York must, therefore, begin with this decision.
161. 241 App. Div. 790, 270 N.Y. Supp. 1020 (4th Dep't 1934).
162. 266 N.Y. 4S, 193 N.E. 634 (1934).
163. Id. at 51, 193 N.E. at 635.
164. 309 N.Y. 231, 12S N.E.2d 391 (1955).
165. N.Y. Mlult. Dwell Law §§ 1S7-S9, 304, 326.
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Assuming arguendo the fundamental validity of a theory of constructive homicide, certain of the innovations implicit in Nelson are logically
supportable. For instance, the decision makes it clear that the underlying offense need not be malum in se. The distinction between offenses
mala in se and mala prohibita is not always apparent, 100 and, therefore,
it forms no logical basis for a classification of offenses to be included
within the misdemeanor-manslaughter section. Rather, the Grieco requirement of a guilty mind is the preferable criterion regardless of the character of the misdemeanor. Nelson also extends Grieco to encompass misdemeanors resulting from an omission to act. This expansion of the rule
also makes sense. No logical principle of law requires that the defendant
be excused from liability for the consequences of his failure to act solely
because no neuromuscular movement on his part produced the harm.1 17
So far, then, Nelson and Grieco are in accord. However, there is a truly
anomalous aspect of Nelson which causes a sharp parting of the ways.
The trial court had excluded all evidence offered by Nelson that he had
been unaware of the condition of the building."" The affirmance by the
court of appeals indicates agreement with the trial court's opinion that
proof of guilty knowledge is not always necessary for conviction of
misdemeanor manslaughter. But let us recall that transferred intent is
the rationale of both felony murder and misdemeanor manslaughter.109
If guilty knowledge is lacking, there is no wrongful intent to be transferred, and there can be no constructive homicide. The court of appeals, thus, left misdemeanor manslaughter without even a pretext of
70
rationality.
The effect of Nelson was to bring within the scope of the misdemeanormanslaughter statute all misdemeanors with the exception of assault,
which have for their purpose the protection of person or property. In
Grieco, it had been held that the felony murder principle-an assault
merges into the resulting homicide-applies also to misdemeanor manslaughter. This remained the rule' 7 1 until the recent case of People v.
166. See Wilner, supra note 155, at 828-30.
167. Id. at 825-26. A killing caused by an omission to act is within the definition of
homicide in New York. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 1042.
168. 309 N.Y. 231, 234, 128 N.E.2d 391, 392 (1955).
169. Id. at 238-39, 128 N.E.2d at 395 (dissenting opinion); 24 Fordham L. Rev. 688, 691
(1956).
170. The illogic of the Nelson decision provoked a highly critical reaction among law
reviews. See, e.g., 41 Cornell L.Q. 722 (1956); 24 Fordham L. Rev. 688 (1956); 31 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1128 (1956).
171. See, e.g., People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 87 N.E.2d 291 (1949); People v. May, 9
App. Div. 2d 508, 195 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dep't 1960). At common law there was no problem
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Monaco, 72 wherein the court of appeals reduced a conviction from
murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first degree (misdemeanor manslaughter) on these facts: defendant and one Fasano,
both members of a teenage gang, set out to assault a member of a rival
gang. Unknown to defendant, Fasano had a gun which he thereafter used
to kill one of the rival gang members. The court of appeals found no
evidence to support defendant's conviction of murder but held that the
record "would sustain a conviction for manslaughter, first degree (under
Penal Law, § 1050, subd. 1), for it could be found as a matter of law
that Monaco, with Fasano, was engaged in a plan to assault the deceased
and that homicide without design by Monaco to effect death resulted ...... ,7The
1
only misdemeanor that Monaco committed was
assault. If the Grieco merger rule had been observed, there would have
been no conviction of misdemeanor manslaughter. Since there was such a
conviction, it follows that Monaco has overruled Grieco. We may assume,
therefore, that every homicide which results from a misdemeanor assault
will hereafter be manslaughter in the first degree.
Nelson and Moizaco have completely subverted Grieco and have made
of misdemeanor manslaughter a monument to the absurdity of constructive homicide. The Temporary Commission has acted wisely in excluding
the crime from the proposed penal law.
G. Culpably Negligent Homicide
In the early common law, a killing per infortunium was a culpable
homicide, although a pardon was ordinarily granted to the perpetrator.
As more sophisticated notions of mens rea were absorbed into the law,
the defense of misadventure replaced the pardon; however, the pendulum
swung too far, and the defense was broadly construed to include a wide
sweep of palpable wrongs. The concept of negligence entered the criminal
law as a practical limitation on the defense of misadventure. If the death
of one was caused by the negligence of another while the latter was
engaged in otherwise lawful activity, the defense was unavailable and the
homicidal actor was liable to punishment for manslaughter. At first, a
standard of ordinary negligence was employed as a means of determining
guilt, but later, the more rigorous criterion of gross negligence was
adopted." 4 It was this latter criterion which was received into the comof merger. A homicide resulting from an assault without an intent to kill or do serious bodily
harm was manslaughter. See Stephen 184.
172.
173.

14 N.Y.2d 43, 197 N.E.2d 532, 248 N.YS.2d 41 (1964).
Id. at 47, 197 N.E.2d at 535, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 45.

174. For informative discussions of the development of culpable negligence in the criminal
law, see Moreland 99-104; Binavince, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33
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mon law of New York and-translated into our statutory precept of
culpable negligence. 17 As included in the Revised Statutes of 1829,170
it was carried forward into the Penal Code of 1881'"7 and the Penal Law
of 1909178 without redefinition.'

At present in New York, a homicide caused by culpable negligence is
either manslaughter in the second degree or criminally negligent homicide.
The manslaughter branch of the crime is defined in section 1052(3) of
the Penal Law:
Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree, when committed without
a design to effect death: ...
3. By any act, procurement or culpable negligence of any person, which, according to the provisions of this article, does not constitute the crime of murder
in the first or second degree, nor manslaughter in the first degree.18 0

The section goes on to enumerate several ways in which a defendant may
be culpably negligent, but these need not concern us since they would
seem to be adequately covered by the catchall wording of section
1052 (3).181

Criminally negligent homicide refers to deaths resulting from "reckless
or culpably negligent" driving," 2 hunting, 18 3 or boating.8 4 The specific
delineation of these homicides removed them from the operation of the
manslaughter section,'8 5 but the standard for determining guilt remained
86
the same.
Fordham L. Rev. 1, 22-27 (1964); Davis, The Development of Negligence as a Basis for
Liability in Criminal Homicide Cases, 26 Ky. L.J. 209 (1938).
The repudiation of the tort standard of care in favor of gross negligence probably resulted
from a popular revulsion toward punishment for slight negligence. Homicide Report 247;
Moreland 112-14. All of us are careless, and sometimes the results of our carelessness are
disastrous. Very few of us would be willing to condemn to penal discipline' the ordinarily
negligent man when "but for the grace of God, there go we."
175. People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 456, 159 N.E. 394, 395-96 (1927).
176. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 661, § 6 (1829).
177. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 676, § 193(3).
178. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1052(3).
179. People v. Joseph, 11 Misc. 2d 219, 231, 172 N.Y.S.2d 463, 476-77 (Kings County
Ct. 1958); see Homicide Report 249-55.
180. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1052(3).
181. At common law manslaughter was a catchall for those unlawful homicides which
did not fall within the definition of murder. Perkins 41. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1052(3) is apparently a codification of the common law approach to manslaughter. "This approach [of
section 1052(3)) is a curious echo of the time when in the ancient common law all unexplained homicides were culpable." Homicide Report 244.
182. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1053-a.
183. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1053-c.
184. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1053-e.
185. See People v. Curnuch, 177 Misc. 606, 31 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Kings County Ct. 1941);
1936 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Rep. 141.
186. People v. Dawson, 206 Misc. 297, 133 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1954); People v.
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It is easy enough to postulate a standard of culpable negligence, but it
is much more difficult to apply it. It is true that we are on firm ground in
excluding from the definition the minimal negligence required for a
cause of action in tort,'87 but beyond this there is only a quagmire of confusion. The troublesome issue is whether guilt requires proof that the actor
was conscious of the risk inherent in his conduct, or whether it is sufficient
to find that he unreasonably failed to perceive the risk. The case law, to
put it euphemistically, is inconclusive. The landmark decision is People
v. Angelo 8 s wherein culpable negligence was defined as "something more
than the slight negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages.
It means, disregard of the consequences which may ensue from the act,
and indifference to the rights of others.""' This definition has been
called an "ambiguous formulation""' with good reason. "Disregard of
the consequences" may imply disregard of a perceived risk or disregard
of circumstances which would have caused a reasonable man to perceive
the risk.' 9 Following Angelo, several decisions emphasized the determinative significance of "consciousness of the probable consequences"' (conscious risk-taking), while still another seemed to equate negligent
homicide with depraved mind murder.9 2 In People v. Gardner,' however, the norm was characterized as "a reckless disregard by the accused
of the consequences of his conduct . . . 2,"07 If "reckless disregard" was
intended to be used in contradistinction to conscious disregard, then the
proffered standard of culpability was an unreasonable failure to perceive
Vrflliams, 1S7 AIisc. 299, 61 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Suffolk County CL 1946). If the standard of
culpability is the same, why enact separate sections? '1he purpose, at least insofar as the
vehicle homicide section (§ 1053-a) is concerned, is to provide a crime of homicide for
fatal automobile negligence cases carrying less stature and punishment than does 'manslaughter,' the theory being that juries are reluctant in this type of case to convict of manslaughter with its severe penalty." Second Report 40.
187. People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927).
1SS. Ibid.
1S9. Id. at 457, 159 N.E. at 396.
190. Model Penal Code § 201.4, comment 1A (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
191. In the opinion of the Temporary Commission, the Angelo rule is more clozly ain
to conscious risk-taking (recklessness). Proposed Pen. Law § 130.10, Commission Staff Notes.
192. People v. Wells, 1S6 Misc. 979, 9S2, 66 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (Sup. Ct. 1946); People
v. Carlson, 176 Misc. 230, 232, 26 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005 (Kings County CL 1941).
193. "The facts and circumstances concerning the operation of the vehicle by the accuscd
must be aggravated in character. They must indicate such a recklesnes and vanton 'devil
may care' attitude on the part of the accused as to evince a contemptuous disregard for
consequence to life and limb of others. In sum, the evidence must disclose what would almost
be tantamount to a wilfulness to do harm on the part of the offender." People v. Brucato,
32 N.Y.S.2d 6S9, 691 (Kings County Ct. 1942). See pp. 1S-90 supra for a discussion of the
distinction between depravity and conscious risk-tahing.
194. 255 App. Div. 683, S N.YS.2d 917 (4th Dep't 1939).
195. Id. at 6W7, S N.Y.S.2d at 921.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 33

risk (inadvertent risk-taking). The cases remained in confusion until
1956 when the court of appeals seemed to settle matters in People v.
Eckert: 196
[T]his conduct arises when the actor has knowledge of the highly dangerous nature

of his actions or knowledge of such facts as under the circumstances would disclose
to a reasonable
man the dangerous character of his action, and despite this knowledge
197
he so acts.

The Eckert rule has been termed an "explicitly external formulation,"'9 but apparently it was not explicit enough for at least one court.
In People v. Joseph,199 culpable negligence was inconsistently interpreted
as a species of depravity, as conscious risk-taking, and as an unreasonable failure to perceive risk:
The jury will ...be required to determine whether or not the defendant was
actually and consciously aware of the fact that by his acts or his omissions he was

creating a risk; that the risk created was both unreasonable and unjustifiable under

all the circumstances established by the evidence; that for a risk to be both
unreasonable and unjustifiable it must involve conduct so highly culpable and blameworthy as to be tantamount or equivalent to an intent to injure another; and that

the defendant in disregarding such a risk knew or should have known that the
probable (as distinguished from possible) consequences of his conduct would result

in death or serious injury to another.20

Obviously a need exists for reformulation of the rule of culpably negligent
homicide in terms sufficiently definitive and precise to achieve uniformity
of application. However, precision is not the only end to be sought; the
rule must also be defensible as a proper postulate of criminal conduct.
The Temporary Commission has proposed a dual test for culpably
negligent homicide. One of these tests, recklessness, meets the requirements above stated. The other, criminal negligence, does not.
1. The Proposed Statute
Recklessness and reckless homicide (manslaughter in the second
degree) have already been touched upon .2 0° The test of culpability is essentially conscious risk-taking. The risk to human life must be substantial
and the actor's conduct in the face of the risk must be grossly unreasonable. Although the objective risk and the actor's conduct seem to
be stated as distinct elements in the determination of culpability, they
cannot be applied as such. The conduct creates the risk, and the con196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956).
Id. at 130-31, 138 N.E.2d at 797, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
Model Penal Code § 201.4, comment 1B (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
11 Misc. 2d 219, 172 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Kings County Ct. 1958).
Id. at 241-42, 172 N.Y.S.2d 486-87. (Emphasis added.)
See pp. 188-89 supra.
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scious creation of a substantial risk of causing the death of another is,
of itself, grossly unreasonable. Even though the separation of risk from
conduct is illusory, the test, as a whole, is satisfactory. Indeed, it is
difficult to envision a more definitive test unless it were an enumeration
of specific kinds of reckless conduct, and such an enumeration would
inevitably be inadequate in view of the infinite opportunities for recklessness in our complex society. As to the propriety of incriminating the reckless actor, not even the most profound critic of negligence as a standard
of criminal liability has come to the defense of conscious risk-taking.F12
Criminal negligence is quite another matter:
A person acts with criminal negligence when he fails to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk (a) that the result described by a statute defining an offense
will occur, or (b) that a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense
exists, and the failure to be aware of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.2 3

A person who, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person is guilty of "criminally negligent homicide,"- 1 a lesser offense than
reckless manslaughter. A number of arguments have been advanced
against punishing an unreasonable failure to perceive risk, ° including
an argument that the proposed statute lacks precision because it fails
to draw a discernible line between criminal negligence and ordinary negligence 20 5 We will concentrate on only one of the several objections: that
there is no utilitarian end to be served by punishing criminal negligence.
We begin with the proposition that "the desirability of inflicting a penal
sanction in cases of various types of negligent homicides will depend upon
the deterrent effect of such sanctions and the necessity of segregating or
rehabilitating persons guilty of such conduct."' - 7 The initial question is
202. See Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability 63 Colum.
L. Rev. 632 (1963). Professor Hall does not seem to be particularly happy with the prozp-Ct
of including the ill, tired, or drunken driver within the recklez3 actor category, but he has
raised no serious arguments in opposition. Id. at 634.
203. Proposed Pen. Law § 45.00(7).
204. Proposed Pen. Law § 130.10. The Model Penal Code has also dichotomized culpable
negligence into recklessness and criminal negligence, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c), (d)
(Off. Draft 1962), as have the statutes of some states. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 33 §§ 4-6,
4-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 940.05, 940.03 (1953). For surveys of the law of
culpable negligence, see Model Penal Code § 201.4, comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959);
Moreland 104-111; Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide-A Study In Statutory Interpretation, 25
Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1936); Note, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 55S (1959).
205. Hall, supra note 202.
206. Id. at 633.
207. Homicide Report 249. For an exposition of the law of homicide in thee utilitarian
terms, see Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pts. 1-2), 37 Colum.
L. Rev. 701, 1261 (1937).
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whether punishment or the threat of it will be effective as a deterrent.
Professor Wechsler thinks that it will:
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may
follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies men with an
additional motive to take care before acting, to use their faculties and draw on

their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct. To some
extent, at least, this motive may promote awareness and thus be effective as a
measure of control. Certainly legislators act on this assumption in a host of situations and it seems to us dogmatic to assert that they are wholly wrong. 20 8

Professor Hall takes the opposite view:
The theory of deterrence rests on the premise of rational utility, i.e. that prospective offenders will weigh the evil of the sanction against the gain of the imagined
crime. This, however, is not relevant to negligent harm-doers since they have not
in the least thought of their duty, their dangerous behavior, or any sanction. Insofar as potential offenders do think of these matters, they are at least reckless when
they act dangerously ...

In any event, no evidence whatever supports the assumption that, in some
mysterious way, insensitive negligent persons 209
are improved or deterred by their
punishment or that of other negligent persons.

Professor Wechsler's reliance on legislators, as authorities on the deterrence of criminals, is ill-placed. If legislators always did the right thing,
we would not need committees of revisors, and a penal law would not
become an amalgam of anachronisms.21 0 Moreover, a distinction must
be made between malum prohibitum legislation, which proscribes specific
conduct, and a generally worded statute which promulgates an unspecific
requirement to be careful. For instance, it seems safe to say that there
are people in New York City who were once wont to cross the street
without regard to the traffic signal, and who now cross only "on the green"
because of the threat of a two-dollar fine. Would they have been similarly
moved to change their ways if the ordinance had merely required "reasonable care" in crossing the street? One doubts it. It is one thing to
proscribe, without exception, a specified course of conduct, and to punish
the actor who intentionally engages in it; it is another to proscribe and
punish inadvertence. As Professor Hall points out, the very fact that the
conduct is inadvertent indicates that no thought has been given to the
sanctions which may be consequent upon it. Furthermore, if in a given
208. Model Penal Code § 2.02, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (Professor Wechsler
was the chief reporter of the Model Penal Code). See Wechsler, Foreword to Symposium on
the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 589, 592; Wechsler & Michael, supra note 207, at
750-51.
209. Hall, supra note 202, at 641-42; see Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 137
(2d ed. 1960).

210. See Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 62-72 (1938).
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set of circumstances, the immediate prospect of causing injury to another
has not been sufficient to stir the actor to awareness of risk, then we
certainly cannot assume that a statute, which makes absolutely no reference to these circumstances, will prompt alertness.
The additional argument may be advanced that punishment of the
actor will, at least, cause him to be alert to the same risks in the future.
This may be true. But it would seem that the realization of having caused
the death of another will provide sufficient incentive for the exercise of
care when the actor is again in the same risk-situation.
So far, we have been speaking, indiscriminately, of criminal negligence
and ordinary negligence. Let us recall that the proposed section requires
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable man. We
are dealing, in other words, with conduct so dangerous to life that the
ordinary negligent man could not have failed to perceive the risk. The
actor who is contemplated by the section must, therefore, be someone
who is afflicted with an extraordinary lack of perception. To put it another
way, his unawareness passes beyond the point of inadvertence, and enters
the realm of incompetence. We know, for instance, that in the law of
torts, a person of low intelligence is held to a standard of ordinary
intelligence, " ' and an inexperienced adult is presumed to possess the
minimum knowledge common to the community. -21 There is nothing in
the proposed penal law to indicate that the same rules would not apply
in the determination of criminal negligence.2 13 For all practical purposes,
then, the only violators of the criminally negligent homicide section will
be those who are least likely to be deterred by it. How can one obey a
mandate to be careful when he is incapable of foreseeing the risk?
There is just as little to be said for the proposed statute as an instrumentality of rehabilitation. First of all, the mentally deficient are pre211. See Prosser, Torts 156 (3d ed. 1964).
212. Id. at 162.
213. It seems unlikely that the mentally deficient will be able to plead, succezzfully, that
they lack substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. "Sevarey
or moderately deficient persons are apt to be institutionalized or otherwise only remotely in
contact with community life, many of the mildly deficient or persons of borderline intelligence may, however, be able to function in every day life if heavy demands and repon.ibilities are not placed on them. Functioning in such a way, their low intelligence is often
unrecognized. Such persons are amenable to basic social controls and moral standards. They
can control their conduct." Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient,
21 Ohio St. L.J. 52, 66 (1960). (Footnote omitted.) Thus the mental defective may be
unable to cope with the heavy demands of a serious risk-situation, and, as a rezult, he may
cause the death of another. His mental deficiency will be no defense to his grozsly unreasonable conduct because, fundamentally, such mental defectives "can control their
conduct." Ibid.
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sumably incapable of learning. Secondly, how do we "rehabilitate" the
inexperienced adult? Even presuming the existence of a pedagogical penal
system, how do we determine the point at which he has attained the
experience
of "a fictitious person, who never has existed on land or
4
sea?

21

One begins to suspect that the criminally negligent homicide section
is not really aimed at the inadvertent risk-taker. Perhaps, after all, it
is intended as a sop to the conscience of a jury, which is unwilling to
punish a reckless driver as severely as a reckless school builder,2 16 but,
at the same time, is unwilling to set him free. 10 If such is the fact, then
the better course would be to eschew benevolent guile and provide a
lesser penalty for vehicular homicides.
There is no valid rationale for the proposed crime of "criminally
negligent homicide." Section 130.10 should be omitted from the proposed
penal law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been a limited one-to critique certain
of the homicidal offenses contained in the Proposed New York Penal Law.
Criticisms have been made, but they must not be blown out of proportion. The proposed law, as a whole, is a monumental achievement, a
telling solution to what has been called the "increasingly urgent issue"
of codification of the criminal law.2 17 Justice Vanderbilt considered revision and codification of the law as one of the primary responsibilities of
a lawyer, 1 8 while Dean Pound urged the need for "competent, scientific,
impartial agencies" to abet the legislative process. 210 The Temporary
Commission and its staff represent the agency which Pound envisioned,
and the proposed penal law is the product of the skill and scholarship
which Vanderbilt considered necessary for competent revision and codification.
214. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 211, at 153.
215. See note 186 supra.
216. "Presumably, the proposed section under discussion, carrying only a four year
maximum prison term, would be used for prosecution of the vast majority of vehicle
homicides, although higher crimes of 'recklessness' could be used for the more heinous offenses .. .. " Proposed Pen. Law § 130.10, Commission Staff Notes.
217. Cohen, Criminal Law Legislation and Legal Scholarship, 16 J. Legal Ed. 253 (1964).
218. Vanderbilt, Men and Measures in the Law 81-85 (1949).
219. Pound, op. cit. supra note 210, at 71-72.

